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Abstract. LP⊃,F is a three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic
which is essentially the same as J3. It has most properties that have been
proposed as desirable properties of a reasonable paraconsistent proposi-
tional logic. However, it follows easily from already published results that
there are exactly 8192 different three-valued paraconsistent propositional
logics that have the properties concerned. In this note, properties con-
cerning the logical equivalence relation of a logic are used to distinguish
LP⊃,F from the others. As one of the bonuses of focussing on the logical
equivalence relation, it is found that only 32 of the 8192 logics have a
logical equivalence relation that satisfies the identity, annihilation, idem-
potent, and commutative laws for conjunction and disjunction.
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1 Introduction
A set of propositions is contradictory if there exists a proposition such that both
that proposition and the negation of that proposition can be deduced from it.
In classical propositional logic, every proposition can be deduced from every
contradictory set of propositions. In a paraconsistent propositional logic, this is
not the case.
LP⊃,F is the three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic LP [13] enriched
with an implication connective for which the standard deduction theorem holds
and a falsity constant. This logic, which is essentially the same as J3 [10], the
propositional fragment of CLuNs [6] without bi-implication, and LFI1 [9], has
most properties that have been proposed as desirable properties of a reasonable
paraconsistent propositional logic. However, it follows easily from results pre-
sented in [1,2,9] that there are exactly 8192 different three-valued paraconsistent
propositional logics that have the properties concerned. In this note, properties
concerning the logical equivalence relation of a logic are used to distinguish
LP⊃,F from the others.
It turns out that only 32 of those 8192 logics are logics of which the logical
equivalence relation satisfies the identity, annihilation, idempotent, and commu-
tative laws for conjunction and disjunction; and only 16 of them are logics of
which the logical equivalence relation additionally satisfies the double negation
law. LP⊃,F is one of those 16 logics. Two additional classical laws of logical
equivalence turn out to be sufficient to distinguish LP⊃,F completely from the
others.
The desirable properties of reasonable paraconsistent propositional logics re-
ferred to above concern the logical consequence relation of a logic. Unlike in
classical propositional logic, the identity, annihilation, idempotent, and commu-
tative laws for conjunction and disjunction do not follow from those properties in
a three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic. Therefore, if closeness to classi-
cal propositional logic is considered important, it should be a desirable property
of a reasonable paraconsistent propositional logic to have a logical equivalence
relation that satisfies these laws. This would reduce the potentially interesting
three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics from 8192 to 32.
The structure of this note is as follows. First, we give a survey of the para-
consistent propositional logic LP⊃,F (Section 2). Next, we discuss the known
properties of LP⊃,F that have been proposed as desirable properties of a reason-
able paraconsistent propositional logic (Section 3). Then, properties concerning
the logical equivalence relation of a logic are used to distinguish LP⊃,F from
the other three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with the properties
discussed earlier (Section 4). After that, we examine the logical equivalence re-
lation of LP⊃,F further and show its key role in the algebraization of LP⊃,F
(Section 5). Finally, we make some concluding remarks (Section 6).
It is relevant to realize that the work presented in this note is restricted to
three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics that are truth-functional three-
valued logics.
There is text overlap between this note and [7]. This note generalizes and
elaborates Section 2 of that paper in such a way that it may be of independent
importance to the area of paraconsistent logics.
2 The Paraconsistent Logic LP⊃,F
A set of propositions Γ is contradictory if there exists a proposition A such
that both A and ¬A can be deduced from Γ . In classical propositional logic,
every proposition can be deduced from a contradictory set of propositions. A
paraconsistent propositional logic is a propositional logic in which not every
proposition can be deduced from every contradictory set of propositions.
In [13], Priest proposed the paraconsistent propositional logic LP (Logic of
Paradox). The logic introduced in this section is LP enriched with an implication
connective for which the standard deduction theorem holds and a falsity con-
stant. This logic, called LP⊃,F, is in fact the propositional fragment of CLuNs [6]
without bi-implications.
LP⊃,F has the following logical constants and connectives: a falsity constant
F, a unary negation connective ¬, a binary conjunction connective ∧, a binary
disjunction connective ∨, and a binary implication connective ⊃. Truth and bi-
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Table 1. Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃,F
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ (B ⊃ A)
((A⊃B)⊃ A)⊃A
(A⊃ (B ⊃ C))⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃ (A⊃ C))
F⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃B
A⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧B))
A⊃ (A ∨ B)
B ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(A⊃ C)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ ((A ∨B)⊃ C))
¬¬A≡ A
¬(A⊃B)≡ A ∧ ¬B
¬(A ∧B)≡ ¬A ∨ ¬B
¬(A ∨B)≡ ¬A ∧ ¬B
A ∨ ¬A
Rule of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
implication are defined as abbreviations: T stands for ¬F and A≡B stands for
(A⊃B) ∧ (B ⊃A).
A Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃,F is given in Table 1. In this formulation,
which is taken from [4], A, B, and C are used as meta-variables ranging over
the set of all formulas of LP⊃,F. The axiom schemas on the left-hand side of
Table 1 and the single inference rule (modus ponens) constitute a Hilbert-style
formulation of the positive fragment of classical propositional logic. The first
four axiom schemas on the right-hand side of Table 1 allow for the negation
connective to be moved inward. The fifth axiom schema on the right-hand side
of Table 1 is the law of the excluded middle. This axiom schema can be thought
of as saying that, for every proposition, the proposition or its negation is true,
while leaving open the possibility that both are true. If we add the axiom schema
¬A⊃ (A⊃B), which says that any proposition follows from a contradiction, to
the given Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃,F, then we get a Hilbert-style formu-
lation of classical propositional logic (see e.g. [4]). We use the symbol ⊢ without
decoration to denote the syntactic logical consequence relation induced by the
axiom schemas and inference rule of LP⊃,F.
The following outline of the semantics of LP⊃,F is based on [4]. Like in the
case of classical propositional logic, meanings are assigned to the formulas of
LP⊃,F by means of valuations. However, in addition to the two classical truth
values t (true) and f (false), a third meaning b (both true and false) may be
assigned. A valuation for LP⊃,F is a function ν from the set of all formulas of
LP⊃,F to the set {t, f, b} such that for all formulas A and B of LP⊃,F:
ν(F) = f,
ν(¬A) =


t if ν(A) = f
f if ν(A) = t
b otherwise,
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ν(A ∧B) =


t if ν(A) = t and ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f or ν(B) = f
b otherwise,
ν(A ∨B) =


t if ν(A) = t or ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f and ν(B) = f
b otherwise,
ν(A ⊃B) =
{
t if ν(A) = f
ν(B) otherwise.
The classical truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions for the logical connec-
tives are retained. Except for implications, a formula is classified as both-true-
and-false exactly when it cannot be classified as true or false by the classical
truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions. The definition of a valuation given
above shows that the logical connectives of LP⊃,F are (three-valued) truth-
functional, which means that each n-ary connective represents a function from
{t, f, b}n to {t, f, b}.
For LP⊃,F, the semantic logical consequence relation, denoted by , is based
on the idea that a valuation ν satisfies a formula A if ν(A) ∈ {t, b}. It is defined
as follows: Γ  A iff for every valuation ν, either ν(A′) = f for some A′ ∈ Γ or
ν(A) ∈ {t, b}. We have that the Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃,F is strongly
complete with respect to its semantics, i.e. Γ ⊢ A iff Γ  A (see e.g. [6]).
For all formulas A of LP⊃,F in which F does not occur, for all formulas B of
LP⊃,F in which no propositional variable occurs that occurs in A, A,¬A 6 ⊢ B
if 6 ⊢ B (see e.g. [1]).1 Moreover, ¬ is an extension of classical negation, i.e.,
for all valuations ν and all formulas A of LP⊃,F: (a) ν(¬A) = t if ν(A) = f,
(b) ν(¬A) = f if ν(A) = t. Hence, LP⊃,F is a paraconsistent logic.
For LP⊃,F, the logical equivalence relation⇔ is defined as for classical propo-
sitional logic: A ⇔ B iff for every valuation ν, ν(A) = ν(B). Unlike in classical
propositional logic, we do not have that A⇔ B iff ⊢ A≡B.
For LP⊃,F, the consistency property is defined as to be expected: A is con-
sistent iff for every valuation ν, ν(A) 6= b.
3 Known Properties of LP⊃,F
In this section, the known properties of LP⊃,F that have been proposed as desir-
able properties of a reasonable paraconsistent propositional logic are presented.
Each of the properties in question has to do with logical consequence relations.
Like above, the symbol ⊢ is used to denote the logical consequence relation of
LP⊃,F. The symbol ⊢CL is used to denote the logical consequence relation of
classical propositional logic.
The known properties of LP⊃,F that have been proposed as desirable prop-
erties of a reasonable paraconsistent propositional logic are:
1 On the left-hand side of ⊢, we write A for {A} and Γ,∆ for Γ ∪ ∆. Moreover, we
leave out the left-hand side if it is ∅. We also write Γ 6 ⊢ A for not Γ ⊢ A.
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(a) containment in classical logic: ⊢ ⊆ ⊢CL;
(b) proper basic connectives : for all sets Γ of formulas of LP⊃,F and all formulas
A, B, and C of LP⊃,F:
(b1) Γ,A ⊢ B iff Γ ⊢ A⊃B,
(b2) Γ ⊢ A ∧B iff Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ B,
(b3) Γ,A ∨B ⊢ C iff Γ,A ⊢ C and Γ,B ⊢ C;
(c) weakly maximal paraconsistency relative to classical logic: for all formulas
A of LP⊃,F with 6 ⊢ A and ⊢CL A, for the minimal consequence relation ⊢
′
such that ⊢ ⊆ ⊢′ and ⊢′ A, for all formulas B of LP⊃,F, ⊢′ B iff ⊢CL B;
(d) strongly maximal absolute paraconsistency: for all propositional logics L
with the same logical constants and connectives as LP⊃,F and a consequence
relation ⊢′ such that ⊢ ⊂ ⊢′, L is not paraconsistent;
(e) internalized notion of consistency: A is consistent iff ⊢ (A⊃F)∨ (¬A⊃ F);
(f) internalized notion of logical equivalence: A⇔ B iff ⊢ (A≡B)∧(¬A≡¬B).
Properties (a)–(f) have been mentioned relatively often in the literature (see
e.g. [1,2,3,5,6,9]). Properties (a), (b1), (c), and (d) make LP
⊃,F an ideal para-
consistent logic in the sense made precise in [2]. By property (e), LP⊃,F is also
a logic of formal inconsistency in the sense made precise in [9].
Properties (a)–(c) indicate that LP⊃,F retains much of classical propositional
logic. Actually, property (c) can be strengthened to the following property: for all
formulas A of LP⊃,F, ⊢ A iff ⊢CL A. In [7], properties (e) and (f) are considered
desirable and essential, respectively, for a paraconsistent propositional logic on
which a process algebra that allows for dealing with contradictory states is built.
From Theorem 4.42 in [1], we know that there are exactly 8192 different three-
valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b). From
Theorem 2 in [2], we know that properties (c) and (d) are common properties of
all three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b1).
From Fact 103 in [9], we know that property (f) is a common property of all
three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a), (b) and (e).
Moreover, it is easy to see that that property (e) is a common property of
all three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b).
Hence, each three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic with properties (a)
and (b) has properties (c)–(f) as well.
From Corollary 106 in [9], we know that LP⊃,F is the strongest three-valued
paraconsistent propositional logic with properties (a) and (b) in the sense that for
each three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic with properties (a) and (b),
there exists a translation into LP⊃,F that preserves and reflects its logical con-
sequence relation.
4 Characterizing LP⊃,F by Laws of Logical Equivalence
There are exactly 8192 different three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics
with properties (a) and (b). This means that these properties, which concern the
logical consequence relation of a logic, have little discriminating power. Prop-
erties (c)–(f), which also concern the logical consequence relation of a logic, do
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Table 2. Distinguishing laws of logical equivalence for LP⊃,F
(1) A ∧ F⇔ F
(3) A ∧ T⇔ A
(5) A ∧ A⇔ A
(7) A ∧ B ⇔ B ∧A
(9) ¬¬A⇔ A
(2) A ∨ T⇔ T
(4) A ∨ F⇔ A
(6) A ∨ A⇔ A
(8) A ∨ B ⇔ B ∨A
(10) F⊃ A⇔ T
(11) (A ∨ ¬A)⊃B ⇔ B
not offer additional discrimination because each of the 8192 three-valued para-
consistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b) has these properties
as well.
In this section, properties concerning the logical equivalence relation of a
logic are used for additional discrimination. It turns out that 11 classical laws
of logical equivalence, of which at least 9 are considered to belong to the most
basic ones, are sufficient to distinguish LP⊃,F completely from the other 8191
three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b).
The logical equivalence relation of LP⊃,F satisfies all laws given in Table 2.
Theorem 1. The logical equivalence relation of LP⊃,F satisfies laws (1)–(11)
from Table 2.
Proof. The proof is very easy by constructing, for each of the laws concerned,
truth tables for both sides. ⊓⊔
Moreover, among the 8192 three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with
properties (a) and (b), LP⊃,F is the only one whose logical equivalence relation
satisfies all laws given in Table 2.
Theorem 2. There is exactly one three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic
with properties (a) and (b) of which the logical equivalence relation satisfies laws
(1)–(11) from Table 2.
Proof. We confine ourselves to a brief outline of the proof. Because ‘non-
deterministic truth tables’ that uniquely characterize the 8192 three-valued para-
consistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b) are given in [2],2 the
theorem can be proved by showing that, for each of the connectives, only one
of the ordinary truth tables represented by the non-deterministic truth table for
that connective is compatible with the laws given in Table 2. It can be shown by
short routine case analyses that only one of the 8 ordinary truth tables repre-
sented by the non-deterministic truth tables for conjunction is compatible with
laws (1), (3), (5), and (7), only one of the 32 ordinary truth tables represented
by the non-deterministic truth tables for disjunction is compatible with laws (2),
(4), (6), and (8), and only one of the 2 ordinary truth tables represented by the
2 A non-deterministic truth table has sets of allowable truth values as results.
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non-deterministic truth table for negation is compatible with law (9). Given the
ordinary truth table for conjunction, disjunction, and negation so obtained, it
can be shown by short routine case analyses that only one of the 16 ordinary
truth tables represented by the non-deterministic truth table for implication is
compatible with laws (10) and (11). ⊓⊔
It follow immediately from the proof of Theorem 2 that all proper subsets of
the laws from Table 2 are insufficient to the distinguish LP⊃,F completely from
the other three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a)
and (b). More particular, the next two corollaries follow immediately from the
proof of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. There are exactly 16 three-valued paraconsistent propositional log-
ics with properties (a) and (b) of which the logical equivalence relation satisfies
laws (1)–(9) from Table 2.
Corollary 2. There are exactly 32 three-valued paraconsistent propositional log-
ics with properties (a) and (b) of which the logical equivalence relation satisfies
laws (1)–(8) from Table 2.
From a paraconsistent propositional logic with properties (a) and (b), it is
only to be expected, because of paraconsistency and property (b1), that its
negation connective and its implication connective deviate clearly from their
counterpart in classical propositional logic. Corollary 2 shows that, among the
8192 three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b),
there are 8160 logics whose logical equivalence relation does not even satisfy the
identity, annihilation, idempotent, and commutative laws for conjunction and
disjunction (laws (1)–(8) from Table 2).
5 More on the Logical Equivalence Relation of LP⊃,F
It turns out that the logical equivalence relation of LP⊃,F does not only satisfy
the identity, annihilation, idempotent, and commutative laws of logical equiva-
lence for conjunction and disjunction but also other basic classical laws of logical
equivalence for conjunction and disjunction, including the absorption, associa-
tive, distributive, and de Morgan’s laws (laws (12)–(19) from Table 3). Indeed,
the logical equivalence relation of LP⊃,F satisfies all laws given in Tables 2 and 3.
Laws (1)–(9) and (12)–(21) axiomatize normal i-lattices [12]. Laws (10)–(11)
and (22)–(24) are laws concerning the implication connective. Laws (10)–(11)
and (22)–(24), like laws (1)–(9) and (12)–(21), are also satisfied by the logical
equivalence relation of classical propositional logic. A′ ⇔ B′ is satisfied by the
logical equivalence relation of classical propositional logic iff it follows from laws
(1)–(9) and (12)–(21) and the laws
(25) A ∧ ¬A⇔ F (26) A ∨ ¬A⇔ T (27) A⊃B ⇔ ¬A ∨B .3
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Table 3. Additional laws of logical equivalence for LP⊃,F
(12) A ∧ (A ∨B)⇔ A
(14) (A ∧B) ∧ C ⇔ A ∧ (B ∧ C)
(16) A ∧ (B ∨ C)⇔ (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
(18) ¬(A ∧ B)⇔ ¬A ∨ ¬B
(20) (A ∧ ¬A) ∧ (B ∨ ¬B)⇔ (A ∧ ¬A)
(22) (A⊃B) ∧ (A⊃C)⇔ A⊃ (B ∧ C)
(24) A⊃ (B ⊃ C)⇔ (A ∧B)⊃C
(13) A ∨ (A ∧B)⇔ A
(15) (A ∨B) ∨ C ⇔ A ∨ (B ∨ C)
(17) A ∨ (B ∧ C)⇔ (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C)
(19) ¬(A ∨B)⇔ ¬A ∧ ¬B
(21) (A ∧ ¬A) ∨ (B ∨ ¬B)⇔ (B ∨ ¬B)
(23) (A⊃ C) ∧ (B ⊃ C)⇔ (A ∨B)⊃C
However, laws (25)–(27) are not satisfied by the logical equivalence relation of
LP⊃,F.
Because A⇔ B iff ⊢ (A≡B)∧(¬A≡¬B), A≡B stands for (A⊃B)∧(B⊃A),
and ⊢ A∧B iff ⊢ A and ⊢ B, we have that A⇔ B iff ⊢ A⊃B and ⊢ B⊃A and
⊢ ¬A⊃¬B and ⊢ ¬B⊃¬A. Moreover, writing A↔B for (A≡B)∧ (¬A≡¬B),
we easily find that (i) ⊢ A↔ A, (ii) A,A↔ B ⊢ B, (iii) A↔ B ⊢ ¬A↔ ¬B,
(iv) A↔B,A′↔B′ ⊢ A⋄A′↔B ⋄B′ for ⋄ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃}, and (v) A ⊢ A↔A∨¬A
and A↔ A ∨ ¬A ⊢ A. Therefore, by Corollary 3.6 from [11] and the fact that
LP⊃,F is a finitary logic, LP⊃,F is finitely algebraizable4 with the equivalence for-
mulas {p⊃q, q⊃p,¬p⊃¬q,¬q⊃¬p} and the single defining equation p = p∨¬p
(p and q are variables). The algebraization concerned is the quasi-variety gener-
ated by the expansion of the 3-element normal i-lattice obtained by adding the
unique binary operation ⊃ that satisfies F⊃ p = T and (p ∨ ¬p)⊃ q = q.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this note, properties concerning the logical equivalence relation of a logic
are used to distinguish the logic LP⊃,F from the other logics that belong to the
8192 three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics that have properties (a)–(f)
from Section 3. These 8192 logics are considered potentially interesting because
properties (a)–(f) are generally considered desirable properties of a reasonable
paraconsistent propositional logic.
Properties (a)–(f) concern the logical consequence relation of a logic. Unlike
in classical propositional logic, we do not have A⇔ B iff A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A in a
three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic. As a consequence, the classical
laws of logical equivalence that follow from properties (a) and (b) in classical
propositional logic, viz. laws (1)–(8) and (12)–(17) from Section 4, do not follow
from properties (a) and (b) in a three-valued paraconsistent propositional logic.
Therefore, if closeness to classical propositional logic is considered important, it
should be a desirable property of a reasonable paraconsistent propositional logic
3 This fact is easy to see because, without law (27), these laws axiomatize Boolean
algebras and, in classical propositional logic, law (27) defines ⊃ in terms of ∨ and ¬.
4 In [8], finitely algebraizable is simply called algebraizable.
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to have a logical equivalence relation that satisfies laws (1)–(8) and (12)–(17).
This would reduce the potentially interesting three-valued paraconsistent propo-
sitional logics from 8192 to 32.
In [7], satisfaction of laws (1)–(8), (11), (14)–(17), and (22)–(24) is considered
essential for a paraconsistent propositional logic on which a process algebra that
allows for dealing with contradictory states is built. It follows easily from The-
orem 1 and the proof of Theorem 2 that LP⊃,F is one of only four three-valued
paraconsistent propositional logics with properties (a) and (b) of which the log-
ical equivalence relation satisfies laws (1)–(8), (11), (14)–(17), and (22)–(24).
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